Operation Typhoon

 

 

The success of Operation Barbarossa was a double edged sword. The constant advance stretched supply lines to the breaking point. The Germans found it almost impossible to supply their forward spearheads. The distance to the rail heads, the movement of infantry to support the mechanized forces, and the exhaustion of the motorized supply system created a logistical nightmare. By late July German front line units were living a "hand-to-mouth" existence in terms of their supplies was making it impossible to build up stockpiles for the next push. For the Luftwaffe, these same factors were operative. The deeper that flying units moved into Russia, the more precarious became their supply situation. By mid-July, air units were crying for fuel and ammunition even though the corps had already limited its missions.  

 

 In late September Hitler returned to the strategy his generals had urged in August: a great offensive aimed at destroying Russian armies lying in the center and at capturing Moscow. The operation's code name was "Typhoon." Setting the tone for the coming weeks, Hitler issued a proclamation demanding that attacking troops complete the work of the campaign and end twenty-five years of Bolshevism in Russia.The Luftwaffe played a decreasingly effective role as the Battle of Moscow approached. Conversely, the Red Air Force, once thought destroyed, mounted increasingly effective attacks against Luftwaffe aircraft that were attacking the Moscow defenders. A primary reason was that the fighting on the Eastern Front had brought the Luftwaffe to desperate straits.

 

Operational ready rates for combat aircraft throughout the force structure sank towards dangerous levels; and in conditions of mud, bad weather, and increasing cold, maintenance personnel found it almost impossible to maintain aircraft. The ready rate for all aircraft hovered near 53 percent. Further complicating the Luftwaffe's problem of flying missions at the end of tenuous supply lines was the fact that its aircraft were flying off primitive dirt strips, while the Red Air Force was using more permanent facilities in the vicinity of Moscow. Hitler's gamble to conquer Russia in one summer had failed. Germany now faced immense commitments in the east with an army and air force that through attrition during the summer and fall had lost their cutting edge.

                                                          

AIRCRAFT	MINIMUMÂ	MAXIMUMÂ
 Bf-109E (Jabo)	16	20Â
BF-109FÂ	No Min	No MaxÂ
BF-110C (Jabo)Â	16	20
JU-87DÂ	 12Â	24
JU-88Â	20	26Â
HE-111Â	20	26Â

 

 

 

   

 

AIRCRAFTÂ	MINIMUMÂ	MAXIMUMÂ
I-16Â	No Min	No Max
Tomahawk II (P40C)	24	36
Hurricane IIB	 24Â	 36Â

                                                

 

-  Bombsight- MA Standard

- Fighters= 5 Points

 

 

Though not assigned as a primary strike target for the Axis. Targeted bases and cities may have rail or truck convoy traffic in the immediate area. As explained above train rail cars including the engine are worth 10 points each and convoy trucks 5 points each. These are considered Supply Targets of Opportunity or (STOs). If the Axis destroys 20 or more rail cars they will be awarded 50 Interdiction Points on top of the 10 points per rail car. If the Axis destroys 20 or more convoy trucks this will also result in the award of 50 Interdiction Points on top of the 5 points per convoy truck. If the Axis fails to destroy 20 or more rail cars or convoy trucks the Allies will be awarded 150 Supply Points for each category.Only Rail or Road traffic  in the immediate area of a base or city assigned as a primary strike target are considered legitimate STOs. Truck or rail traffic in random areas of the map will not count for Bonus Interdiction Points. 

 

-  Maximum Alt for fighters 20K

-  Down Draft at 20K